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ABSTRACT Shifting patterns of tobacco production and consumption, and the resultant
disease burden worldwide since the late twentieth century, prompted efforts to strengthen
global health governance through adoption of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
While the treaty is rightfully considered an important achievement, to address a neglected public
health issue through collective action, evidence suggests that tobacco industry globalization
continues apace. In this article, we provide a systematic review of the public health literature and
reveal deﬁnitional and measurement imprecision, ahistorical timeframes, transnational tobacco
companies and the state as the primary units and levels of analysis, and a strong emphasis on
agency as opposed to structural power. Drawing on the study of globalization in international
political economy and business studies, we identify opportunities to expand analysis along each
of these dimensions. We conclude that this expanded and interdisciplinary research agenda
provides the potential for fuller understanding of the dual and dynamic relationship between the
tobacco industry and globalization. Deeper analysis of how the industry has adapted to glo-
balization over time, as well as how the industry has inﬂuenced the nature and trajectory of
globalization, is essential for building effective global governance responses. This article is
published as part of a thematic collection dedicated to global governance.
Introduction
The marked shift in tobacco-related disease and death, from traditional to emergingmarkets in low and middle-income countries (LMICs), began to garner major attentionwithin the public health community during the 1980s (Stebbins, 1987). The 1983
World Conference on Smoking and Health, for example, was the ﬁrst to give major attention to
the increased targeting of “Third World countries” by tobacco companies. The expansion
of transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) into Latin America from the 1960s, newly
industrialising economies in Asia during the 1980s, and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and
Africa from the 1990s also raised growing concerns (Nichter and Cartwright, 1991; Connolly,
1992; MacKay, 1992). The creation of the World Health Organization (WHO) Programme on
Tobacco or Health in 1990 was underpinned by a reframing of tobacco use, from a focus on
individual lifestyle choices, to societal factors that shape risk behaviours (Balbach et al., 2006).
This latter perspective intensiﬁed collective action by WHO member states, initially by
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“documenting the scale of the tobacco epidemic” (Boucher, 2000),
and then negotiating the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC) (Collin et al., 2002).
The FCTC is rightfully lauded as a key marker in emerging
forms of global health governance (GHG). Adopted in May 2003,
and entering into force in February 2005, the international treaty
boasts 180 states parties (nearly 90% of the world’s population) as
of May 2016. During the ﬁrst decade of implementation, the treaty
has led to important achievements. Financial support from the
Bloomberg Philanthropies, and Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tion, has funded a WHO-led effort to implement six measurable
and proven tobacco-demand reduction measures known by the
acronym MPOWER. Data on tobacco consumption has also been
signiﬁcantly improved through the four surveys of the Global
Tobacco Surveillance System—Global Youth Tobacco Survey,
Global School Personnel Survey, Global Health Professions Student
Survey, and Global Adult Tobacco Survey—developed by the US
Centers for Disease Control, WHO and Canadian Public Health
Association. This data has enhanced capacity in LMICs to design,
evaluate and report on the implementation of key FCTC articles
(Ng et al., 2014). Celebrating the FCTC’s tenth anniversary in 2015,
WHO Director-General Margaret Chan cited 7.3 million deaths
averted because of the adoption of at least one high-impact
demand reduction measure in 41 countries (Chan, 2015).
Importantly, fuller understanding of tobacco industry activities
supported these efforts, substantially enabled by the public release
(through whistleblowers and US litigation) of internal tobacco
industry documents beginning in the 1990s (Hurt et al., 2009).
Alongside a WHO inquiry (WHO, 2000), and reports by
investigative journalists (Beelman et al., 2000) and civil society
organizations (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids/ASH, 2001),
painstaking analyses of millions of documents by public health
researchers revealed industry tactics and strategies for expanding
worldwide (Glantz et al., 1996; Lee et al., 2012b; Gilmore et al.,
2015). This evidence has been fundamental to negotiating and
implementing the FCTC.
Despite these achievements, and discussion of a tobacco
“endgame” (Novotny, 2015), production and consumption
continues to grow worldwide. While global adult (aged 15+
years) smoking prevalence has declined, from 29% in 1995 (Jha
et al., 2002) to 21.1% in 2013 (WHO, 2015), aggregate data
obscure increases in certain populations such as young females
and indigenous peoples. Moreover, because of growing popula-
tions, the absolute number of users and volume consumed are
increasing (Ng et al., 2014). In 2014 there were 1 billion smokers
worldwide, consuming 5.8 trillion cigarettes, resulting in 6
million tobacco-related deaths annually (Eriksen et al., 2015).
This is projected to rise to 1.6 billion smokers by 2025 (Bilano
et al., 2015), causing 8 million deaths annually by 2030 (WHO,
2015). Behind these trends is a buoyant industry that has
continued to enjoy growth and proﬁtability. In 2015, the
industry experienced its best year by volume sales since 2006,
and TTCs have boasted record highs in share prices and
ﬁnancial returns since 2011 (Wachman, 2012; Gara, 2014;
Banjo, 2016). The illicit tobacco trade has also thrived during
the same period, embedded within a network of criminal activity
with global reach (FATF, 2012). As Fooks (2014) writes, “despite
growing regulatory risks there has always been a tendency to
exaggerate news of the industry’s demise.”
In this context, this article argues that collective action to stem
the tobacco pandemic requires fuller understanding of the nature
and dynamics of tobacco industry globalization. We begin by
reviewing the existing public health literature on tobacco industry
globalization, identifying how globalization is deﬁned and
measured, historically located, conceptualised by unit and level
of analysis, and ascribed with power. On the basis of the ﬁndings
of this review, we draw on the disciplines of business studies and
international political economy (IPE) to set out an inter-
disciplinary research agenda. We argue that this expanded
understanding of tobacco industry globalization is a prerequisite
to strengthening GHG.
Tobacco industry globalization: a review of the public health
literature
We searched the peer-reviewed public health literature on tobacco
industry globalization, published from 1980–2016, during March–
April 2016 using PubMed (which includes citations and abstracts
from the ﬁelds of biomedicine and health, covering portions of the
life sciences, behavioural sciences, chemical sciences, and bioengi-
neering). Searches were conducted using the keywords “globali*a-
tion” AND “tobacco” AND “industry” (n= 490); “transnational”
AND “tobacco” AND “industry” (n=106); and “globali*ation”
AND “transnational” AND “tobacco” (n=57). Articles primarily
concerned with tobacco use, or tobacco-related morbidity and
mortality, were excluded. Articles related to the tobacco industry’s
pursuit of globalization, or how the industry has sought to inﬂuence
globalization, were included. After duplicates were removed, the
remaining 76 papers were coded along four dimensions (see
supplementary Table 1): deﬁnitions and measures of globalization;
analytical timeframe; units and levels of analysis; and nature of
power amid tobacco industry globalization.
Deﬁnitions and measures of globalization used. While an
explicit deﬁnition of globalization is not provided in most of the
articles reviewed, each associates tobacco industry globalization
with one or more of the following trends.
First, 44 articles (58%) associate globalization with increased
policy inﬂuence of the industry. Most papers describe how TTCs
undermined national-level tobacco control policies in Europe
(Hilamo, 2003; Szilagyi and Chapman, 2003a, 2004; Gilmore et al.,
2007; Krasovsky, 2010; Shrinae et al., 2012; Lunze and Migliorini,
2013; Skaﬁda et al., 2014), Asia (Chantornvong et al., 2000; Knight
and Chapman, 2004a; MacKenzie et al., 2004; Tong and Glantz,
2004; Zhong and Yano, 2007; MacKenzie and Collin, 2008; Muggli
et al., 2008; Charoenca et al., 2012), the Middle East (Nakkash and
Lee, 2009), Latin America (Sebrie et al., 2005, 2009; Holden and
Lee, 2011) and Africa (Curry and Ray, 1984; Stebbins, 1987; Otanez
et al., 2009; Delobelle et al., 2016). A few studies focus on policy
inﬂuence at the regional and global levels through industry bodies
(Ong and Glantz, 2000; McDaniel et al., 2008), trade and
investment agreements (Holden and Lee, 2011; Fooks and
Gilmore, 2013; Crosbie et al., 2014; Eckhardt et al., 2015), public
health bodies (Weishaar et al., 2012; Peeters et al., 2016; Smith
et al., 2016b) and religious groups (Petticrew et al., 2015).
Second, 30 articles (39%) deﬁne globalization as TTC market-
ing activities in emerging markets. Moodie et al. (2013) describe
transnational corporations as “major drivers of global epidemics
of NCDs”, including the “sale and promotion of tobacco” in
LMICs. This has been achieved through sophisticated marketing
strategies promoting western lifestyles, and developing products
for new markets (Szilagyi and Chapman, 2004; Hafez and Ling,
2005; Gilmore, 2012; Delobelle et al., 2016). Marshall (1991)
attributes the shift in Oceanic island countries since the 1980s,
from “home-grown and twist tobacco” to commercially manu-
factured cigarettes, to aggressive marketing. Ethnographic
research in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Peru concludes that
“TTC’s marketing strategies override cultural differences in the
choices people make regarding smoking and health” (Stebbins,
2001). Internal documents reveal the speciﬁc strategies to achieve
this. Knight and Chapman (2004b) examine how TTCs used the
themes of music, entertainment, adventure, sport, glamour and
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independence “to construct a tobacco culture” among young
Asians. TTCs in Japan “developed a lucrative market for mild, light,
and ultra-low-tar cigarettes” by playing on the concept of keihaku
tansho (light-thin-short-small) (Assunta and Chapman, 2007), and
using Hollywood ﬁlm stars (Lambert et al., 2004). Stanton et al.
(2010) document how BAT “sought to transfer values associated
with [London’s Ministry of Sound] lifestyle brand” to China and
Taiwan. Where necessary, TTCs adapted marketing strategies to
local contexts and targeted speciﬁc populations, notably females
and youth (Lunze and Migliorini, 2013). In South Korea, British
American Tobacco (BAT) undertook market research to “under-
stand consumer preferences, cultural characteristics and social
changes affecting women and girls” (Lee et al., 2009). TTCs
overcame “entrenched cultural and institutional barriers” by
identifying youth as “more favourably inclined towards imported
brands”, and using new distribution channels and promotional
activities. Japan Tobacco International (JTI) (Honjo and Kawachi,
2000) and KT&G (Lee et al., 2012a) responded to foreign
competition by mimicking their marketing strategies.
Third, 25 papers (33%) associate globalization with market
access and growth by TTCs in emerging markets. In many cases,
this was achieved through the above described policy inﬂuence
encouraging countries to liberalize tobacco trade and investment,
privatize state-owned enterprises, and pursue joint ventures. This
literature describes TTCs expanding through takeovers in Latin
America from the 1960s (Stebbins, 1994), leaf growing in Africa
from the 1970s (Curry and Ray, 1984; Otanez et al., 2009), and
pressuring Asian markets to open from the 1980s (Connolly, 1992;
Lee et al., 2013; MacKenzie et al., 2015). For example, Gultekin-
Karakas (2015) examines how “the liberalisation process facilitated
by the state under the auspices of international institutions …
paves the way for market expansion” of TTCs in Turkey. The
aggressive expansion of TTCs in Eastern Europe is ascribed to
liberalization, coinciding with the end of the Cold War (Gilmore
and McKee, 2004b; Gilmore et al., 2005; Gilmore et al., 2007).
Other analyses focus on how privatization (Gilmore et al.,
2005; Nakkash and Lee, 2008; Hurt et al., 2012; Gultekin-Karakas,
2015), tariffs and taxation (Szilagyi and Chapman, 2003a;
Gilmore et al., 2007; Krasovsky, 2010; Holden and Lee, 2011;
Shrinae et al., 2012), intellectual property rights and investor-state
dispute settlement mechanisms (Fooks and Gilmore, 2013), have
been used to facilitate TTC market access and growth (Drope and
Chavez, 2015). The illicit trade is also described as part of TTC
strategies, with complicity in large-scale cigarette smuggling
extending into Eastern Europe (Gilmore and McKee, 2004a;
Skaﬁda et al., 2014), Asia (Lee et al., 2004; Lee and Collin, 2006;
Lee et al., 2008), Africa (LeGresley et al., 2008) and the Middle
East (Nakkash and Lee, 2008). Smuggling circumvented import
bans and quotas in restricted markets, helped to undermine
regulation, and build brand presence ahead of market opening.
Fourth, four articles (5%) associate globalization with structural
consolidation of the industry, although none provide detailed
analysis. Yach and Bettcher (2000: 207) describe how “mega
mergers and acquisitions have dramatically changed the face of
the worldwide cigarette industry” and created “an increasingly
globalised marketplace”. Similarly, Bialous and Peeters (2012)
examine a 20-year period from the early 1990s as “marked by
mergers and acquisitions [M&As] that led to the existence, today,
of four major transnational tobacco companies”. Holden and Lee
(2009) write that the industry “operates in an essentially
oligopolistic fashion, and the market positions of TTCs are
strongly protected by barriers to entry”.
It is because of the absence of clear deﬁnition, perhaps, that the
existing literature does not measure tobacco industry globaliza-
tion in any meaningful way. Where globalization is associated
with policy inﬂuence, for instance, the indicator is whether
policies favourable or unfavourable to industry interests (for
example, tax and tariff rates) are supported by policy makers. For
example, Szilagyi and Chapman (2004) argue that, along with
“early participation in the privatisation of the former state
tobacco monopoly”, there was a “well orchestrated industry effort
to inﬂuence decision makers to avoid strict regulation” in
Hungary. Hurt et al. (2012) cite two favourable amendments in
less than 4 years, by the Indonesian Government Regulation on
the Tobacco Control Act, as evidence of TTC inﬂuence. However,
these papers are primarily concerned with the political power of
TTCs in various policy settings, which may or may not be related
to globalization per se. Papers which deﬁne globalization as
marketing cite speciﬁc marketing practices, targeted populations,
and changes in tobacco consumption. For instance, Chu et al.
(2011) describe how BAT and Philip Morris International (PMI)
studied the role of gift giving in Chinese custom and adapted
marketing of their brands accordingly. Papers deﬁning globaliza-
tion as market access and growth largely refer to increased
presence and market share in a given country. For example, Lee
et al. (2009) analyse South Korea following market liberalization,
and found TTCs increased market share from 2.9% in 1988 to
41.7% in 2009. Acquisitions of kretek manufacturers by PMI and
BAT are used as indicators by Hurt et al. (2012) that “TTCs have
now successfully penetrated the Indonesian cigarette market” and
begun “their Westernized transformation”.
Analytical timeframe of tobacco industry globalization. We
looked at the timeframes in which tobacco industry globalization
is analysed in the public health literature. While 88% of the
reviewed literature has been published since 2000, 3 papers (4%)
locate their analysis from the 1960s; 5 (7%) from the 1970s; 18
(24%) from the 1980s; 43 (57%) from the 1990s and 7 (9%) from
the 2000s onwards. The desire for evidence to support the FCTC
process, which commenced in the late 1990s, may have focused
greater research efforts on this time period. The public release of
millions of internal industry documents also explains the tem-
poral focus of the existing literature. The capacity to search digital
copies of these documents, via the creation of on-line archives
during the 2000s, greatly enabled new scholarship (Hurt et al.,
2009). However, the collections currently hold few documents
dating later than the early to mid 2000s.
Units and levels of analysis. The unit of analysis in social research
refers to the major entity (the “who” or “what”) analysed from
which data is gathered. Level of analysis concerns the location, size
or scale of a research target. Together, the unit and level of analyses
help deﬁne the population of a research enterprise.
Fifty-ﬁve (72%) of the papers reviewed (and 80% of papers
published since 2000) use TTCs as the unit of analysis.1 Detailed
descriptions of TTC activities are painstakingly gleaned from
internal documents, providing valuable glimpses of the activities
of speciﬁc companies. This literature offers analysis of how the
industry is changing, often in speciﬁc groups of countries or
regions, and TTC adaptation accordingly. A good example is
Gilmore (2012) who documents “how the global tobacco market
has changed, how [TTCs] are responding and the implications for
tobacco control”. Similarly, Bialous and Peeters (2012) discuss the
“large number of privatisations, mergers and acquisitions [M&As]
that served to strengthen the position of the four largest TTCs”
since the early 1990s. For the most part, this research treats TTCs
as part of an increasingly homogeneous industry in pursuit of
globalization. For example, Yach and Bettcher (2000: 207) describe
“how the tobacco industry operates as a global force, regarding the
world as its operating market by planning, developing, and
marketing its products on a global scale”. They describe the
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“homogenisation of the global tobacco industry and the creation of
a new global shared culture enshrined in the concept of a global
smoker” (Yach and Bettcher, 2000: 207). With the accumulation of
detailed knowledge about TTC activities over time, scope for
comparative analysis of TTC activities is now possible. As Gilmore
(2012: 124) writes, “While the global market context is identical for
all TTCs, there may be differences in the nature of each company’s
response”.
Seventeen of the reviewed papers (22%) focus on the industry,
with much of this scholarship published before 2000. Most of this
work sets out broad trends in the industry, in terms of, its
structural consolidation and expansion into LMICs. For the most
part, this research is descriptive in nature, and offers limited
explanation in relation to globalization of the world economy.
Four papers (7%) use the state as the unit of analysis. For
example, Chantornvong et al. (2000: 913) apply political mapping
and stakeholder analysis to understand the political and economic
context for tobacco control in Zimbabwe and Thailand. They
conclude that the policy environments “are clearly being shaped
by developments in the global political economy, which means
that efforts to strengthen national control policies need to be set
within the context of globalization”. Lunze and Migliorini (2013)
conduct a state-focused analysis of TTC inﬂuence of tobacco
control policy in Russia since the 1990s. Baker et al. (2014)
analyse how international and regional trade regimes have
facilitated increased market penetration by TTCs, and driven
increased tobacco consumption in Asian countries. Eckhardt
et al. (2015) retain a focus on the state unit, but extend analysis to
trends or patterns in the positions of World Trade Organization
(WTO) members on tobacco control measures.
The levels of analysis of the papers reviewed are distributed as
follows: 45 (59%) are national; 6 (8%) are regional and 24 (32%)
are global.2 The geographical distribution of papers for national
and regional level analyses is Asia (24), Europe (13), Latin America
(6), Africa (3) and the Middle East (3). Stebbins (1994) unusually
brings together “macro-level and micro-level implications of the
tobacco companies’ promotions” with smoking behaviours by
secondary school students in Mexico and Guatemala.
Agency versus structural power in tobacco industry globali-
zation. Farnsworth (2004) distinguishes between the agency and
structural power of corporations. Agency power is the capacity of
corporations to act independently in ways that achieve desired
ends. Firms may exert agency power through various forms of
political engagement and institutional participation. Structural
power operates in situations where governments are compelled to
favour industry interests without the need for ﬁrms to take
explicit action. Farnsworth and Holden (2006) write that globa-
lization tends to increase corporate structural power by increasing
the mobility of capital. Since investment is a fundamental source
of production, employment, consumption and, by extension, tax
revenues, the opportunity for corporations to move operations
out of a national economy may compel the government to act in
ways amenable to corporate interests.
The focus, in 72 (95%) of the reviewed papers, is on the
exertion of agency power by the tobacco industry to gain
favourable outcomes. This is consistent with the prevailing
deﬁnition of tobacco industry globalization as policy inﬂuence
and TTCs as the primary unit of analysis. Many papers document
the use of agency power in speciﬁc national settings to inﬂuence
science and policy (for example, Hilamo, 2003; Szilagyi and
Chapman, 2003b; Gilmore et al., 2005; Gilmore et al., 2007; Sebrie
et al., 2009; Charoenca et al., 2012; Shrinae et al., 2012; Lunze and
Migliorini, 2013, Holden et al., 2010b). Others analyse agency
power exerted at regional (Holden and Lee, 2011; Peeters et al.,
2016) or international levels (Zhong and Yano, 2007; Holden
et al., 2010a; Weishaar et al., 2012; Crosbie et al., 2014; Eckhardt
et al., 2015), as well as through third parties (Tong and Glantz,
2004; Mamudu et al., 2008; McDaniel et al., 2008; Muggli et al.,
2008; Petticrew et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2016a). Lee et al., (2012b)
review the broad range of TTC tactics used “to block tobacco-
control policies and promote tobacco use” in LMICs. Gilmore
et al. (2015) summarize how “industry systematically ﬂaunts
existing tobacco control legislation”, and uses “domestic litigation
and international arbitration to bully LMICs”.
The agency power of the tobacco industry, to inﬂuence the
FCTC process, is also well recognized (Morley et al., 2002;
Wipﬂi, 2015). During negotiations, the industry secured
membership on national delegations (Assunta and Chapman,
2006; Jin, 2014), sought to undermine WHO (WHO, 2000), and
lobbied delegates (Otanez et al., 2009). Assunta (2012) discusses
how the industry-funded International Tobacco Growers
Association mobilized farmers to inﬂuence Conference of the
Parties (COP4) negotiations, and defeated adoption of FCTC
Articles 9 and 10 guidelines, and Articles 17 and 18 progress
reports. Wipﬂi (2015) describes industry lobbying of delegates,
presence on national delegations, hiring of private consultants
and third party organizations to support industry positions, and
diversion of attention to youth prevention and voluntary codes.
She concludes that:
Despite its supposed exclusion from the FCTC process, the
presence of the tobacco industry was felt throughout the
negotiations. Their arguments formed the backbone of many
of the most contentious debates among countries, and their
impact is obvious in the ﬁnal text of many key provisions in
the treaty. (Wipﬂi, 2015: 52)
Overall, as Yach and Bettcher (2000) observed, the primary
research focus remains on the “huge tobacco multinationals …
attempting to manipulate globalisation trends in their favour”.
An interdisciplinary research agenda on tobacco industry
globalization
While tobacco industry globalization has received deserved
attention within the public health community, resulting in a
stronger evidence base for collective action, the above review
points to opportunities for fuller understanding through an
interdisciplinary research agenda. This can be achieved by
drawing on two disciplines in which globalization has been a
core concern: IPE and business studies.
Clarifying deﬁnitions of tobacco industry globalization. As a
ﬁrst step, we believe a more precise deﬁnition of globalization is
needed. The deﬁnitions of globalization used in the public health
literature (focussing predominantly on policy inﬂuence, market-
ing, and market access and growth) imply an expanded capacity
by the tobacco industry to assert inﬂuence, operate, and secure
economic gains, over a wider geographical territory. However, it
is difﬁcult to delineate what is changing in the tobacco industry,
whether this is new or distinct, and whether existing or new
collective action is needed to govern its trajectory and impacts.
The work of Scholte (2008) is useful for distinguishing
globalization from the terms liberalization, universalization,
westernization and internationalization. What is novel about
globalization, he argues, is “a shift in the nature of social space”:
The trans-territorial connections of globality are different
from the inter-territorial connections of internationality. The
transborder transactions of globality are different from the
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open-border transactions of liberality. The transplanetary
simultaneity and instantaneity of supraterritoriality is different
from the worldwideness of universality. The geographical
focus of globality is different from the cultural focus of western
modernity. Although globalisation … has some overlap with,
and connections to, internationalisation, liberalisation, uni-
versalization and westernization, it is not equivalent to any of
these older concepts and trends (Scholte, 2008: 1499).
This conceptualization is consistent with Dicken’s distinction
between “internationalization” and “globalization”. Internationali-
zation involves the “simple extension of economic activities across
national boundaries. It is, essentially, a quantitative process which
leads to a more extensive geographical pattern of economic
activity” (Dicken, 2015). Globalization is qualitatively different,
involving “not merely the geographical extension of economic
activity across national boundaries but … the functional integra-
tion of such internationally dispersed activities” (Dicken, 2015). In
this sense, internationalization and globalization co-exist, but “in
ways which are highly uneven in space, in time and across
economic sectors. Very few industries are truly and completely
global although many display some globalizing tendencies”
(Dicken, 2015). Much of what is currently claimed to be tobacco
industry globalization falls under what Dicken (2015) describes as
“nothing new”. For example, the practices of “state control over the
market … gradually removed” (Gultekin-Karakas, 2015), use of
“vehicles and themes to construct a tobacco culture in Asia”
(Knight and Chapman, 2004b), development of “a lucrative market
for mild, light, and ultra-low-tar cigarettes” (Assunta and
Chapman, 2007) and “state-owned cigarette monopolies … taken
over by the TTCs” (Connolly, 1992: 29) are describable with “pre-
existent vocabulary” (Scholte, 2008: 1473).
What needs fuller understanding is the extent to which the
tobacco industry is located within a “new geo-economy” (Dicken,
2015). To what extent have industry actors, or aspects of their
operations, progressed beyond replication and expansion into new
national markets, to the restructuring of their operations
supraterritorially. Holden et al. (2010a) and Holden and Lee
(2011) have begun to explore this trend in Latin America,
including regional restructuring and TTC efforts to inﬂuence trade
rules to support this operational logic. There is evidence that the
global consolidation of tobacco leaf growing and processing,
centred around three (Hammond, 1998) and then two dominant
ﬁrms, is being accompanied by supraterritorial restructuring
(Goger et al., 2014). Overall, appreciation of these deﬁnitional
distinctions offers greater precision about the nature of the changes
occurring in speciﬁc parts of the tobacco industry, and as a whole,
and thus the extent to which true globalization is occurring.
Measuring degree and variation in tobacco industry globali-
zation. More precise indicators are needed to measure tobacco
industry globalization. Rather than describing globalization as
binary in occurrence, uniform across the industry, or linear in its
trajectory, globalization can be studied as a process that is hap-
pening to varying degrees in different parts of the industry, at
different geographical locations, with diverse features and varying
impacts on production and consumption. We suggest measuring
globalization by focusing on two types of indicators.
First, ﬁrm-level indicators measure changes in individual
companies that suggest progression from national, to interna-
tional, to global concerns. A key ﬁrm-level indicator is business
type such as sole proprietorship, partnerships, corporations and
cooperatives. Each type (and subtype) has different forms of
ownership, governance, liability, regulatory burden and taxation.
All have been found in the tobacco industry but, over time,
corporations have dominated (Callard et al., 2005; Physicians for
a Smoke-Free Canada, 2008). Changes to ownership, from state-
owned to private enterprises via privatization and M&As, have
been especially important in tobacco industry globalization. Firms
that privatize, but do not “go large”, appear at risk of being
swallowed up by other ﬁrms seeking regional or global economies
of scale. Moreover, most TTCs are publicly-traded rather than
private companies, with shareholders distributed worldwide. This
form of ownership may facilitate globalization by enabling access
to sufﬁciently large capital investment. There are notable
exceptions such as JTI (partly state-owned) and the state-owned
China National Tobacco Corporation. Analysis of the relation-
ship between type of business and form of ownership, and global
business strategy pursued, remains needed.
Type of organizational structure can also serve as ﬁrm-level
indicators of globalization. A ﬁrm initially seeking to expand
foreign markets will traditionally establish separate domestic
and foreign divisions. As the ﬁrm’s business shifts increasingly to
foreign markets, it may replicate its domestic operations
in foreign markets (for example, multinational enterprise).
As foreign markets grow even further, the ﬁrm may adopt a
more decentralized organizational structure divided by function,
production or service, customer or location (that is, transnational
enterprise). There are many variations to the latter, to support a
global business strategy, in terms of the distribution of assets,
operations and human resources (Chee and Harris, 1998). A
more globalized ﬁrm will, not only have substantial foreign
operations, but hold a larger proportion of assets offshore,
perhaps to reduce tax liability (Stulz, 1999).
Other indicators could be the diversity of senior management,
levels of intra-ﬁrm trade, and distribution of a ﬁrm’s operations
across different jurisdictions. A higher proportion of sales and
earnings will not only be achieved through exports, but through
overseas production by joint ventures, licensed manufacturers or
factories abroad. This organizing principle can be understood in
relation to a global production or supply chain (for example,
manufacturing, R&D, raw materials) (van Hoeck et al., 2010).
This type of data can be gleaned from company reports, as well as
business and ﬁnancial news sources. A particularly useful source
is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), which provides an “internationalization index” for
the world’s top 100 non-ﬁnancial TNCs, calculated as the number
of (majority owned) foreign afﬁliates divided by number of all
afﬁliates (UNCTAD, 2015). UNCTAD also compiles a “transna-
tionality index” for the annual World Investment Report
calculated as the average of three ratios: foreign assets to total
assets; foreign sales to total sales; and foreign employment to total
employment (UNCTAD, 2015). This measure has been compara-
tively applied to tobacco (Holden and Lee, 2009) and alcohol
companies (Hawkins et al., 2016). Fortunemagazine also provides
revenue data for the world’s largest 500 companies (Global 500)
list (Fortune, 2015). These data exclude smaller, but highly
transnationalized, ﬁrms. Depending on the availability of
standardized and longitudinal data, indicators such as the above
could be used to develop a composite index of tobacco industry
globalization.
A second way to measure tobacco industry globalization is
industry-level indicators. These concern changes to the structure
and activities of the industry as a whole. One potential indicator is
the concentration ratio. Using the Herﬁndahl—Hirschman Index
(HHI)3 as the most commonly accepted measure of market
concentration, Hawkins et al. (2016) show that the tobacco
industry in almost all countries has a very high concentration
ratio, often the most concentrated sector in an economy. Further
research is needed to calculate and analyze HHI scores for the
tobacco industry by region and globally over time, to understand
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trends in concentration of the industry as a feature of
globalization. This, in turn, can inform more detailed analysis
of the factors behind these trends (for example, barriers to entry,
business strategies), and the implications for global governance.
The work of Philip Shepherd, on the concentration of cigarette
manufacturing into an oligopoly in Latin America from the
1960s, is a useful starting point. He writes that stagnation of
traditional markets prompted ﬁerce competition for new markets,
notably between US companies and BAT. By the late 1970s, a
“two-tiered stratiﬁcation of ﬁrms” (Shepherd, 1985) emerged,
consisting of TTCs seeking regional expansion, and facilitated by
barriers to entry (for example, economies of scale, brand
awareness) and economic policies. Smaller ﬁrms (for example,
Reetsma, Lorillard, Liggett) retreated to national markets and/or
diversiﬁed into other products. There is a need to extend this
analysis, beyond the 1980s, when tobacco industry globalization
accelerated worldwide (Denniston, 2010).
Another set of useful industry-level indicators are offered
through global value chain (GVC) analysis. This framework
captures the interconnectedness of certain sectors in the world
economy, including shifting patterns of tobacco trade and
production. GVCs are “globally dispersed networks of ﬁrms
and other institutional actors that coordinate to produce given
goods or services for consumption” (Goger et al., 2014: 1). The
framework is a promising conceptual tool to “understand how
these networks are organized, reconﬁgured, and coordinated at
different levels—national, regional, and global”, through “an
examination of actors involved, stages of production in the chain,
trade patterns, market dynamics, and governance structures to
inform policy that promotes economic and social development”.
Building on “more comprehensive understanding” of the tobacco
industry in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Indonesia (Goger et al., 2014: 1),
GVC analysis could be applied to other national, regional and
global settings. For this purpose, a wide array of large-scale data
gathering and analysis projects by key international organiza-
tions, such as the OECD-WTO Joint Trade in Value Added
Database (TiVA), World Input-Output Database of the European
Commission (Timmer, 2012), could be usefully drawn upon.
Studies of the economic impact of GVCs, sponsored by the World
Bank (Taglioni and Winkler, 2014) and International Monetary
Fund (Saito et al., 2013), are also noteworthy. Such data help
identify points in the tobacco GVC which are more or less
globalized, and how this chain is distributed across different
geographies. In addition, fuller understanding of the illicit
tobacco trade, estimated to constitute around 11% of the world
cigarette trade in 2008 (Joosens et al., 2009), could be similarly
mapped using GVC analysis. Accurate data on volumes, sources
and geographical ﬂows are not possible, given the nefarious
nature of the trade, and its passage through several jurisdictions
before ﬁnal sale. Nevertheless, using a GVC framework to
integrate existing studies of selected national and regional
jurisdictions will provide a clearer understanding of the increased
interconnectedness of the illicit trade over time and space.
Extending the temporal analysis of tobacco industry globali-
zation. Analysis of tobacco industry globalization would beneﬁt
from greater attention to temporal dimensions of change, their
location within particular historical timeframes, and the articu-
lation of these with geographical factors. The literature does
acknowledge differences in geographical focus over time. It
remains unclear, however, how the pace of globalization has
progressed or varied over time across different geographies. The
work of Shepherd (1985) is again useful, in this respect, by
documenting what might be considered as a ﬁrst phase of tobacco
industry globalization in Latin America in the 1960s. Building on
this work, Lee et al. (2013) identify two subsequent phases of
expansion, in Asia from the 1980s and Eastern Europe in the
1990s. Future research may examine a fourth phase, comprising
the emergence of new TTCs, most likely from Asian companies
adapting to foreign competition and seeking to globalize.
Importantly, not all ﬁrms will pursue a global strategy at the
same time or pace, or even at all. Some may not be capable, or
choose deliberately not, to globalize. First, there can be non-
globalization whereby a ﬁrm focuses attention solely on the
domestic market. We suggest classifying such ﬁrms, with a purely
national orientation, as domestic tobacco companies. Second,
where a ﬁrm is active in regional markets, in addition to the
domestic market, there is a strategy of semi-globalization. For
example, ﬁrms may initially focus on expanding activities
regionally and, if successful and desirable, later expand operations
(Rugman, 2005). Semi-globalization implies “neither extreme
geographical fragmentation of the world in national markets nor
complete integration” (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004: 6). Regional
strategies should be viewed, in this sense, as a complement, rather
than alternative, to domestic operations. Tobacco ﬁrms with this
orientation can be classiﬁed as regional tobacco companies.
Third, where a ﬁrm is active domestically, regionally, and beyond,
these ﬁrms might be classiﬁed as TTCs engaging in globalization.
Together, this suggests a more sophisticated conceptualization
whereby domestic, regional and global business strategies can co-
exist and impact upon each other. Firms may pursue different
strategies over time depending on diverse internal and external
factors at play (Ghobadian et al., 2014).
An expanded historical timeframe of tobacco industry
globalization would also beneﬁt from several excellent histories of
tobacco production and consumption, which offer important
contextualization of contemporary trends (Kluger, 1996; Cox,
2000; Gately, 2001; Brandt, 2008; Proctor, 2011). Brandt (2008)
observes that “[n]o one has followed globalization more closely or
better understood its implications than the tobacco companies”
(452). Analysis of tobacco industry globalization can build on these
important works by, for example, relating existing patterns of leaf
production to colonization (Benson, 2012), trends in the illicit trade
to the history of marginalized populations, and emergence of TTCs
to the spread of neo-liberalism from the late twentieth century.
Diversifying units and levels of analyses. As described above,
TTCs are the unit of analysis in most of the literature to date
given the prominence of their activities and access to internal
documents. Moreover, TTCs have largely been studied as unitary,
separate and homogeneous actors operating at the national level.
The business studies literature, sometimes written by industry
insiders, is valuable for understanding the distinct way in which
TTCs, given varied operating environments and organizational
structures, have engaged with globalization. Ghoshal and Nohria
(1993) evaluate 41 large companies (including RJ Reynolds, BAT
and Swedish Match) to identify combinations of environment
and structure that work better than others. Former BAT Head of
Supply Chain Development, Andy Birtwistle, analysed the ﬁrm’s
experiences reconﬁguring its European and global supply chains
(Godsell et al., 2010; van Hoeck et al., 2010).
Beyond TTCs, there are opportunities for new insights by
expanding attention to other units and levels of analyses (see
Table 1). Looking at other industry actors along the GVC—
including national ﬁrms and state-owned enterprises, leaf growers
and processers, and other sectors directly supporting TTC
operations (for example, ﬁnanciers, logistics, accountants,
management consultants, advertising ﬁrms, legal representatives,
wholesalers and retailers)—would provide fuller understanding of
the diversity of globalization experiences. A further set of actors
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support the political and economic interests of the industry
worldwide including industry associations, chambers of com-
merce, third parties, manufacturers of tobacco-related products
(for example, matches, lighters, cigarette paper), media and
industry funded groups. The comprehensive mapping of industry
actors in some national settings (Granero et al., 2004; Li, 2012)
could be extended to the global level. There is much to be learned
from comparative analysis of the motivations and strategies for
globalization by different industry actors. By comparing ﬁrm-
level indicators discussed above, we may answer such questions as
why some pursue globalization while others do not; what
different business strategies they use and why; and whether and
why some are more successful than others.
For identifying why an actor may pursue globalization in the
ﬁrst place, the work of Dunning and colleagues is useful. TTCs
may be understood as seekers of natural resources, new markets,
efﬁciency or strategic assets. Firms may choose to adopt a global
business strategy for one or more of these reasons (Yip, 1998;
Dunning and Lundan, 2008a, b). There are also key advantages of
a global over domestic business strategy. This may explain, for
example, different patterns of vertical integration in leaf
production (for an analysis of the Brazilian case see, for example,
Ladu, 2014; Tuinstra, 2014).
Other business literature helps us to better understand and
compare speciﬁc strategies by ﬁrms pursuing globalization. The
most direct strategy is exporting to customers outside of a ﬁrm’s
domestic market. Alternatively, the ﬁrm may engage in indirect
exports, for example, by licensing of another ﬁrm to supply a
foreign market. If a ﬁrm wishes to be physically closer to foreign
customers, then they may engage in foreign direct investment (FDI)
including strategic alliances with other ﬁrms (for example, joint
venture), M&As and setting up a new venture (that is, greenﬁeld
investments). Internally, ﬁrms may reorient towards foreign
markets, gain further efﬁciencies and enhance access to inputs in
several ways. Firms may also recruit human capital (for example,
business executives, consultants and management) to gain specialist
knowledge and acquire new technology and knowledge (for
example, leaf production, manufacturing machinery) to improve
quality and productivity. Or ﬁrms may adapt or develop new
products (for example, low tar cigarettes) that appeal to target
consumers. Firms may engage in direct and indirect marketing to
increase brand recognition. Finally, ﬁrms may establish new
distribution channels including legal and illegal means. Some of
these strategies have been documented, in relation to the tobacco
industry, but only in selected contexts and timeframes. For example,
Shepherd (1985) examines the replacement of national tobacco
companies in Latin America by TTC subsidiaries by the 1980s,
achieved through a combination of legal and illegal strategies that
resulted in control of the entire product cycle. To date, there has
been no systematic, and limited comparative, analysis across
different industry actors, contexts and timeframes to explain which
strategies have been pursued where, by whom and why.
The above can also contribute to deeper analysis of the
industry, as a whole, as the unit of analysis. As described above,
there are a broad range of industry-level indicators to measure its
changing nature and dynamics amid globalization. This would
especially beneﬁt growing interest in comparative analysis of
tobacco with other health-related industries including alcohol,
food and drink, and pharmaceuticals (Wiist, 2010; Hawkins et al.,
2016; Kenworthy et al., 2016). How does tobacco industry
globalization compare with other industries in form, dynamics,
trajectory and, from a public health perspective, regulatory needs?
Such comparisons would also help us to analyse the extent to
which the tobacco industry should be treated differently to other
health-harming industries.
Understanding the interplay between structural and agency
power. As indicated in the literature review above, the vast
majority (96%) of the reviewed papers focus on agency power—
that is, the ability of ﬁrms to act independently in ways that
achieve desired ends—by tobacco ﬁrms. The agency power of
TTCs has undoubtedly been a key driver of tobacco industry
globalization, and much remains to be understood about how the
industry has asserted agency power in diverse venues, through
direct and indirect actions, and over time. For example, TTCs
have increasingly exploited “judicialized” forms of global gov-
ernance. Eckhardt et al. (2015) analyse TTCs lobbying within the
context of the WTO and show how this has increased opposition
to stronger tobacco control measures on the side of developing
countries. Similarly, there has been growing study of how the
industry has strategically framed tobacco control issues in ways
favourable to its interests. This capacity has been well-
documented in relation, for example, to the scientiﬁc evidence
on tobacco and health science (Bero, 2003; Hurt, et al, 2009); the
“accommodation” of smokers in public smoking restrictions
(Dearlove et al., 2002; Sebrie and Glantz, 2007); and the need for
“constructive solutions”, “sensible regulation” and “good gov-
ernance” (Smith et al., 2009). More research is needed to extend
framing theory (Schön and Rein, 1996) to industry efforts to
shape the governance of globalization. How TTCs frame regimes
on, for example, trade and investment (Fooks and Gilmore,
2013), anti-trust, ﬁnancial reporting, taxation and criminal
activity warrant fuller attention.
It is this need to understand both industry adaptation to, and
its efforts to shape, globalization that points to the interplay
between agency and structural power. Holden and Lee (2009)
suggest that agency power can be exerted to promote certain ideas
that frame issues and policy responses, and thus shape the
consequent “rules of the game”. Once embedded in global
Table 1 | Units and levels of analysis to study tobacco industry globalization
Unit of analysis Examples
individual adult smokers, senior executives, tobacco farmers, policymakers, lobbyists, ethnic minorities, smugglers, industry consultants
group diaspora, board of directors, transit agents, corporate relations departments
organization ﬁrms, industry associations, think tanks, WTO, International Chamber of Commerce
artifact business strategy documents, advertisements, social media content, packaging and labelling, nicotine delivery products
geographical area countries, free trade zones, low-income countries, regional markets
social interaction lobbying, CSR initiatives, donations, legal actions, public hearings, public relations, meetings and conferences
Level of analysis
organizational ﬁrms, front groups, government ministries, tobacco industry
state countries
system global tobacco market (oligopoly), global supply chain, world economy, criminal network
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governance, the ideas themselves come to constitute structural
power, delimiting what is seen as acceptable or unacceptable,
possible or impossible. The choices of other actors are structured
and there is less need for agency power. In the tobacco industry,
globalization has brought dominance by an oligopoly, with
enormous resources to exert agency power by selecting, exploiting
and, indeed, shaping the institutions of global governance. With
extensive resources and worldwide reach, TTCs have opportunities
to exploit the complexity and fragmentation of global governance
mechanisms, and shape them to serve their interests. Baker et al.
(2014: 66), for instance, show how the liberalization of trade and
investment allows TTCs, and other “transnational risk commodity
corporations”, to “rapidly move investments, technologies, produc-
tion capacity, raw materials and ﬁnal products across borders and
thereby drive risk commodity consumption transnationally”.
At the same time, TTC power may not be as impermeable as
often described. Forty percent of world production is still
accounted for by state-owned enterprises (Hogg et al., 2015).
The rise of Asian tobacco companies, and continued restructuring
of the industry and individual ﬁrms, supports Farnsworth’s
(2004) assertion that agency and structural power varies over
time. The greater opportunity by industry actors to “venue shop”,
amid increased regime complexity, illustrates the above. Actors
may shop for the policy-making forum or legal institution where
they are most likely to obtain a favourable outcome, and attempt
to shift decision-making to that forum. Evidence suggests that
venue shopping ﬁrms are generally TNCs “sourcing from abroad
or ﬁrms with foreign subsidiaries, that are confronted with an
unresponsive home government and use the opportunities of the
multiple [global] venues available” (Eckhardt and De Bièvre,
2015: 513). This logic appears to apply to the tobacco industry,
but more research is needed on how TTCs have promoted the
formation of alternative venues, including the reframing of issues
(Baumgartner and Jones, 1991) such as packaging (intellectual
property rights), tariffs (market access), illicit trade (law and
order) and farming (rural employment), in ways that allow the
shifting of public health issues to these venues. Jarman (2014), for
example, argues that shifting public health debates to “exclu-
sionary” trade and investment venues shapes political conﬂict by
inﬂuencing “which voices are heard or excluded from a particular
debate”.
As well as beneﬁtting from regime complexity, TTCs may seek
to shape emerging forms of global governance through political
strategies and inﬂuence during trade and investment negotia-
tions. Research shows that the largest and most productive ﬁrms
beneﬁt from such agreements via increased trade, investment
and production opportunities (Melitz, 2003). These ﬁrms also
have greater means to inﬂuence policy outcomes and restructure
their production processes accordingly. TTCs are among the
world’s largest and most productive ﬁrms, and are well-placed to
inﬂuence negotiations and reap their beneﬁts. Building on the
study of ﬁrm involvement in trade agreement formation (Chase,
2003; Dür, 2007; Eckhardt and Poletti, 2015), and tobacco
industry inﬂuence of negotiations within the Andean Pact and
Central American Common Market (Holden et al., 2010a;
Holden and Lee, 2011) and WTO accession (Holden et al.,
2010b), there is need for analysis of other trade and investment
negotiations. This includes indirect inﬂuence through front and
proxy groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce
(Hakim, 2015).
Implications for global health governance. Widespread recog-
nition of tobacco industry globalization, and its population health
impacts, prompted collective action efforts including adoption of
the FCTC. The FCTC negotiation process, and subsequent
implementation, was remarkably successful in shifting public
debate, from a focus on personal responsibility and behavioural
change, to locating tobacco control within the domain of global
governance. However, because the treaty was ostensibly prompted
by public health concerns about the expansion of the tobacco
industry into emerging markets, and the consequent rise in
tobacco-related morbidity and mortality, policy measures have
largely focused on transferring or scaling up tobacco control mea-
sures used in traditional markets. There is far less understanding of
the distinct governance challenges posed by globalization. As Bol-
lyky and Fidler write,
the FCTC makes few demands on parties to address
international aspects of tobacco control. It contains no
obligations concerning licit international trade and invest-
ment, cross-border advertising, assistance for developing
countries, or strong dispute settlement. The FCTC requires
parties to monitor and prevent illicit trade in tobacco products
within their territories, with a promise to consider a protocol
[agreed but not yet in effect] on international cooperation on
cigarette smuggling at a later date …. the FCTC’s binding
provisions focus on domestic tobacco-control measures that
were effective, but did not require a treaty for countries to
implement. (Bollyky and Fidler, 2015)
This article demonstrates how public health research can be
supplemented by an interdisciplinary agenda that provides clearer
deﬁnition and measurement, more diverse units and levels of
analyses, location within an historical timeframe, and under-
standing of the interaction between agency and structural power.
There is need for fuller understanding of how globalization has
elicited adaptation by different industry actors, across different
institutional settings and geographies, over time. Expanded
research would offer important insights for strengthening global
governance to address the increasingly transnational nature of the
industry. This would include stronger implementation of FCTC
Article 5.3, supply-side measures, and policy coherence with
other global governance spheres.
The latter point reminds us that the realms of global
governance relevant to tobacco control go far beyond the public
health sphere (Collin, 2012). Indeed, there are forms of global
economic governance that effectively serve tobacco industry
interests. This is because compliance with many of the rules of
international economic organizations, such as the World Bank
and WTO, are backed by compulsion (for example, lending
conditions) or “hard” law (for example, trade sanctions). In
contrast, international social organizations mainly rely on “soft”
law (for example, codes of conduct). The FCTC is a binding
international treaty but lacks mandatory enforcement mechan-
isms or punitive measures for noncompliance. On the one hand,
therefore, globalization prompts collective action responses by
state and non-state actors that together constitute expanding
forms of global governance. On the other hand, global
governance is evolving in a messy and uneven manner, including
overlapping spheres of operation, regulatory gaps, unclear lines of
authority and even competing goals. Tobacco industry globaliza-
tion has occurred amid this evolving context.
Moreover, conﬂicts between norms in international law, such
as obligations under the FCTC and WTO agreements, remain
unresolved (McGrady, 2012; Eckhardt et al., 2015). Following
WTO’s establishment in 1995, attention to the implications for
tobacco control has focused on industry use of such agreements
to press for increased market access (Shaffer et al., 2005) or
prevent stronger regulation. For example, the Agreement on
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, General Agreement
on Trade in Services and Agreement on Technical Barriers to
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Trade have all been used to challenge the adoption of plain
packaging, ingredients disclosure and labelling (Gervais, 2010;
Frankel and Gervais, 2013; Marsoof, 2013; Eckhardt et al.,
2015). Investor–state dispute settlement gives TTCs legal
standing to directly challenge tobacco control measures under
investment treaties. This proliferation of bilateral and regional
agreements, and stalling of WTO negotiations, has made the
trade and investment regime even more complex (Alter and
Meunier, 2009). Despite the attempt to construct an over-
arching multilateral institution in the form of the WTO, the
numerous and overlapping bilateral, regional, plurilateral and
multilateral treaties form a “spaghetti bowl” rather than
ordered hierarchy of institutions and agreements (Bhagwati,
1995). A fuller understanding of tobacco industry globalization,
and the related ability to exploit such complexity via agency and
structural power, will be crucial to future tobacco control
efforts.
Notes
1 Before the large-scale release of internal industry documents in the late 1990s, most of
the reviewed literature broadly examine industry activities in LMICs as the unit of
analysis (Stebbins, 1987; Connolly, 1992; MacKay and Crofton, 1996).
2 Some of the papers reviewed use more than one level of analysis.
3 The HHI is calculated by squaring, and then adding together, the market share of all
the ﬁrms competing in a particular sector.
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